NEW NAME
I have renamed the blog because I will be including cases from federal circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, in addition to opinions out of the Florida appellate courts. Coverage will also extend to ADR cases, such as the following:
MEDIATION / CONFIDENTIALITY
Are mediations really
confidential?
The facts as set forth in the
opinion are that Benes was an employee who sued his employer after only for
four months on the job, alleging sex discrimination. At the EEOC-arranged
mediation, the parties caucused after an initial joint session and, upon
receiving the settlement proposal, Benes stormed into the room occupied by his
employer’s representatives and said loudly: “You can take your
proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I'll see you in court.” Benes
stalked out, and, within an hour, the employer “accepted Benes’s counterproposal:
it fired him.” Benes then proceeded with
an anti-retaliation claim and abandoned his sex discrimination claim. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer, holding that because the employee was fired for
misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of
discrimination, he had no claim for retaliation.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
stating: “Mediation would be less
useful, and serious claims of discrimination therefore would be harder to
vindicate, if people could with impunity ignore the structure established by
the mediator. Allowing a sanction against a person who by misconduct wrecks a mediation
will promote the goals of [42
U.S.C.] §2000e-3(a). Benes has not cited any case holding that misconduct
during a mediation must be ignored. Many cases show that misconduct during
litigation may be the basis of sanctions (by the court, if not by another
litigant). We cannot see why misconduct
during mediation should be consequence free. Judges do not supervise mediation,
which makes it all the more important that transgressions be dealt with in some
other fashion.” (citations omitted).
This case should give pause to
those of us that tell the litigants that everything is confidential. See Ellen E. Deason, “Predictable Mediation
Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System,” 17 Ohio
St. J. on Disp. Resol. 239 (2002).
ARBITRATION
Lagstein
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16114 (9th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2013) is the latest in the protracted battle between Dr. Lagstein,
a nuclear cardiologist, who made a claim in 2001 on a disability insurance
policy against Lloyd's of London. “Lloyd’s
pussyfooted for years only to eventually deny the claim, so Dr. Lagstein sued in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada. Lloyd's moved to arbitrate
pursuant to the policy, and the District Court granted the motion.
Illustrating the maxim ‘be
careful what you wish for,’ the arbitration was wildly successful for Dr. Lagstein, resulting in a total damages
award of over $6 million against Lloyd's, including $4 million in punitive
damages. Lloyd's, unhappy with the result of the arbitration it had demanded,
successfully moved in the District Court to vacate the award. Dr. Lagstein appealed, and this court
reversed and remanded with instructions to confirm the award. The District
Court then confirmed the award but denied Dr. Lagstein’s request for interest and attorneys’ fees.”
The court now reversed the ruling
on interest and attorneys’ fees, confirming the power of the arbitrators to
award pre-award interest on contract damages, the power of the court to award
post-award prejudgment interest on the total award, including non-contract
damages and caps it off by awarding post-judgment interest on the total
judgment, including pre-judgment interest to the date of the judgment
confirming the award.
EMPLOYMENT
Dejesus
v. Hf Mgmt. Servs., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16105 (2d Cir. August 5, 2013)
affirmed the dismissal of a suit filed by an employee based on allegations by a
plaintiff that she was a wage-earning employee of defendant for three years and
that she worked more than forty hours per week during “some or all weeks” of
her employment and, in violation of the FLSA, was not paid at a rate of at
least 1.5 times her regular wage for each hour in excess of forty hours, was
insufficient. Plaintiff relied on the
FLSA's provision in 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
In affirming, the court reasoned that the complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim, citing to Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). More
specifically, in Lundy v. Catholic Health System of Long Island, 711
F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013), the court had concluded that “to state
a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours
of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the
40 hours.” Lundy,
711 F.3d at 114.
Dejesus provided less factual
specificity than did the plaintiff in Lundy. “She did not estimate
her hours in any or all weeks or provide any other factual context or content.
Indeed, her complaint was devoid of any numbers to consider beyond those
plucked from the statute… Whatever the precise level of specificity that was
required of the complaint, Dejesus at least was required to do more than repeat
the language of the statute.”
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