Sunday, September 9, 2012

InsideCounsel Article



InsideCounsel published an article I wrote.  I am attaching the link.  Let me know what you think.

http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/09/07/technology-using-modern-methods-to-streamline-alte

Technology: Using modern methods to streamline alternative dispute resolution

The Internet, video conferencing and Second Life can lead to efficient resolutions

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Decisions of interest from this week


 
JUROR INTERVIEWS

Borroto v. Garcia, --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 3d DCA September 5, 2012) reversed the denial of a motion to conduct juror interviews where the defendant showed that certain jurors prior injuries and litigation history.  In a concurring opinion, Judge Emas wrote on the third prong of De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1995), which states that “[t]he failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party’s lack of diligence.” 
According to Judge Emas, De La Rosa rejected the broad proposition that any motion for new trial based upon a juror’s concealment of litigation history required (in order to satisfy the diligence prong) that the search be conducted at the conclusion of jury selection rather than at the conclusion of the trial.
“However, the supreme court did not prohibit a trial court, in an individual case and in the proper exercise of its discretion, from imposing a reasonable requirement of conducting a records check at the conclusion of jury selection.”
Judge Emas suggests that the trial judge may issue a specific pretrial order in an individual case directing the parties to conduct such a search.  “In light of the extraordinary amount of time, energy and expense that is often required for the modern civil trial, giving trial judges the discretion to impose these common-sense procedures, in the appropriate exercise of their discretion, is not simply reasonable, but laudable.
 
http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D11-2678.pdf

 

PROHIBITION / DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

Phillip Morris v. Brown, --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 1st DCA September 5, 2012) tells us that it is not a good idea to compare a witness to Dr. Josef Mengele, the infamous Nazi war criminal known as the “Angel of Death.”  That is what the trial judge stated in ruling on the admissibility into evidence of a 1971 videotape of Philip Morris’ former CEO, Joseph Cullman, in which Cullman suggests that lower birth weights caused by smoking may actually be desirable to some women who “might prefer having smaller babies.”  The defendant immediately moved to disqualify the judge.  In granting the writ of prohibition, the appellate court stated that the judge’s statements were so inflammatory that a party would be placed in reasonable fear of judicial bias.
 
http://opinions.1dca.org/written/opinions2012/09-05-2012/12-3090.pdf


 
IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENT

Reffaie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 4th DCA September 5, 2012) reversed for a new trial on damages, stating:
  • Here, appellant correctly argues that there was no evidence to support defense counsel’s argument in closing that law firms transported their clients to Dr. Gomez en mass, or that Dr. Gomez had any “business relationships” with personal injury law firms. At one point, defense counsel even suggested that it was Dr. Gomez who bused the clients “right back up for the purposes of litigation.” We agree that the improper comments at issue were intended to, and did, impugn the doctor’s credibility and objectivity in the eyes of the jurors. While we have little issue with the line of questioning, the problem here is that defense counsel did not obtain the desired answers but continued in closing argument as though he had.
http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept%202012/09-05-12/4D10-2494.op.pdf


INADEQUATE VERDICT

Santiago v. Abramovitz, --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 4th DCA September 5, 2012) reversed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on damages due to the jury’s zero verdict. Here, the defendant stipulated before trial that his negligence caused the accident and that the plaintiff sustained a permanent injury because of the accident.
 
http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept%202012/09-05-12/4D11-711.op.pdf

 
FORECLOSURES / AFFIDAVITS

Finnegan v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 4th DCA September 5, 2012) found that there was a genuine issue of material fact where the defendant’s answer specifically denied that she had received notice of the default in accordance with the terms of the mortgage. Deutsche Bank then filed a motion for summary judgment. Its affidavit in support did not mention the conditions precedent. Defendant filed an affidavit in opposition again swearing that she had received no notice of default in accordance with the mortgage provisions. The bank also filed copies of letters allegedly sent to defendant but these were not sworn and could not be considered on a motion for summary judgment.
 
http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept%202012/09-05-12/4D11-939.op.pdf

BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE

Trafalgar at Greenacres, Ltd. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 4th DCA September 5, 2012) held that obtaining an appraisal award against the insurer satisfied the insured’s obligation to have the underlying claim “resolved favorably” under Blanchard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. 1991)).
 
http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept%202012/09-05-12/4D11-1376.op.pdf

 

Tuesday, September 4, 2012

Opinions from the Eleventh Circuit


CLASS ACTIONS / TYPICALITY / SETTLEMENT OBJECTORS
 
Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18465 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012) rejected the class action objectors’ arguments that the class did not satisfy the prerequisites to class certification set forth in Rule 23(a), because the class representatives’ claims lacked the required typicality.  While each class member may have a stronger or weaker claim, the court concluded that this alone did not make class representatives’ claims atypical of the class as a whole. Class members' claims need not be identical to satisfy the typicality requirement; rather, there need only exist “a sufficient nexus . . . between the legal claims of the named class representatives and those of individual class members to warrant class certification.” Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2000). This nexus exists “if the claims or defenses of the class and the class representative arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory.” Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984). The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the claims of the class representatives and class members are typical and warrant class certification.
 

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18464 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012) affirmed the dismissal of a breach of lease agreement suit based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.  In the lease the Tribe expressly waived its sovereign immunity concerning any lawsuits Contour might bring based on the Tribe's default or breach of the lease agreement, but the entire lease’s validity was explicitly conditioned upon approval by the Secretary of the Interior, and such approval was never obtained.
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201111997.pdf


ROOKER-FELDMAN / RES JUDICATA / COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Vasquez v. YII Shipping Company, Ltd., --- F.3d --- (11th Cir. August 30, 2012) vacated an order dismissing a seaman’s complaint alleging violations of the Jones Act, and federal maritime law of unseaworthiness.  Vasquez originally filed his suit in Florida court, which dismissed his claims based on Florida’s doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Vasquez then brought the same claims in federal district court, arguing that federal maritime law applied to his case and that venue was not improper under federal forum non conveniens principles. Although the Florida court never decided whether federal maritime law was applicable to Vasquez’s case, the district court ruled that under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, Vasquez was precluded from litigating facts relevant to his federal maritime claims. The district court then dismissed Vasquez’s complaint on the grounds of federal forum non conveniens and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on its application of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The appellate court found that collateral estoppel applies only when identical issues are involved and that was not the case here. Likewise, res judicata applies only to a final judgment on the merits and, therefore, was not applicable here where there has been no merits determination.  Finally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was a narrow doctrine that only applies to an attempt to appeal a state court judgment. The doctrine holds that federal courts below the Supreme Court must not become a court of appeals for state court decisions. The state court appellant has to find a state court remedy, or obtain relief from the U.S. Supreme Court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “confined to cases” that were “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobile Corp. v Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  In this case, Vasquez’s lawsuit does not seek appellate review of the state court’s decision applying Florida’s forum non conveniens rules to his claims. Instead, Vasquez seeks review of the district court’s order that federal maritime law does not apply to his case, an issue not resolved by the state court.
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201115141.pdf



Monday, September 3, 2012

New DCA Opinions



PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

Lyons v. Chamoun, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 14493 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 29, 2012) held that where the Proposal for Settlement was directed to the defendant owner and offered to release the defendant, the proposal was ambiguous because the plaintiff had sued both the owner and driver of the vehicle.  The better practice is to attach the proposed settlement rather than attempt to describe it.  See Juan Ramirez, Jr., Florida Civil Procedure, § 21-5, at n.415.2 (2d. ed.).



FORECLOSURE / MOTION TO VACATE

Gascue v. HSBC Bank, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 14491 (Fla. 4th DCA August 29, 2012) reversed the denial of a motion to vacate summary judgment at a non-evidentiary hearing.  The motion alleged that the defendant had retained counsel who did not appear at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.  In addition, defendant asserted a meritorious defense that the bank had no standing as it was not the holder of the note and mortgage at the time suit was filed.



CERTIORARI / MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF TRANSFER BOND / AFFIDAVITS
Bayview Constr. Corp. v. Jomar Props., LLC, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 14505 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 29, 2012) denied certiorari relief even though the trial court may have erred in reducing the bond because petitioner had received notice of the evidence that respondents would be presenting at the hearing, but petitioner did not present any affidavits until the day of the hearing.  Affidavits must be served a reasonable time before the hearing.  See Juan Ramirez, Jr., Florida Civil Procedure, § 7-3(f), at n.161 (2d. ed.).



TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A DEAD BODY / RECKLESS INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Mellette v. Trinity Mem. Cemetery, Inc., 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 14477 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug. 29, 2012) reversed a summary judgment in favor of a cemetery that disinterred a body at the request of the mother and sent it for reburial in Texas against the widow’s express wishes.  “Certainly, a surviving spouse’s right to direct the disposition of her deceased’s body is no less invaded when the party to whom she has entrusted the body disinters it and ships it out of state without her knowledge and against her expressed wishes.”  The court also reversed the summary judgment on the count for reckless infliction of emotional distress, saying that “…we cannot say that as a matter of law Trinity’s conduct did not reach the level of outrageousness required to support this tort.”



ATTORNEY'S FEES

Hall v. White, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 14328 (Fla. 1st DCA August 29, 2012) concluded that the trial court erroneously taxed $84,898.25 in attorney’s fees against the defendant on the plaintiffs’ unpaid wage claim under Chapter 448, F.S., because the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof and because the trial court erred in concluding that the issues and claims in the case were inextricably intertwined. Under F.S. § 448.08, attorney's fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing party in an action for unpaid wages, but F.S. § 448.08 does not apply to independent contractors. Here, the plaintiffs brought a claim for unpaid wages, but also brought a claim concerning Dr. White’s service as an independent contractor. The jury awarded plaintiffs $916.14 on their unpaid wage claim and $23,707.94 in damages on the remaining claim. The issues in the case were not inextricably intertwined because the claims could support independent actions and were not simply alternative theories of liability for the same wrong.  As to the fees awarded under F.S. § 57.105, the trial court erred in not splitting the fees between the defendant and her attorney.